AI Security and Privacy

AI Agent Runtime Security Review

Make every delegation explicit. Examine who the agent acts for, where it can execute and which tools it can reach when instructions alone are not enough.

Inspect identity, execution and tools as connected controls

Delegation boundary
Trace the principal and the action they authorised.
Execution boundary
Limit the runtime resources and routes in scope.
Tool boundary
Validate target, arguments and confirmation conditions.
Control evidence
Connect each intended restriction to an observable check.
The scope, team and timing are agreed before an engagement begins.

Engagement boundary

Agree the work and its boundaries together

The engagement boundary

In scopeDelegation boundary
Identity: workload identity for agents, credential lifecycle, user-to-agent and agent-to-agent delegation, least privilege, propagation across tools, attribution and revocation.
DependencyExecution boundary
The inputs, authorised access and client participants are confirmed before scheduling.
Client responsibilitySecurity owner
Retains organisational decisions and risk acceptance.
BoundaryAdditional implementation
Runtime redesign and infrastructure changes are not implied by the review. Remediation verification can be added for named findings; subsequent connector or sandbox changes need their own checks.
Only the agreed workflow, environments and activities form the engagement.

What the work covers

  • Identity: workload identity for agents, credential lifecycle, user-to-agent and agent-to-agent delegation, least privilege, propagation across tools, attribution and revocation.
  • Sandbox: isolation boundaries, escape resistance, filesystem and network egress controls, secret exposure, resource limits, persistence and cleanup, auditability.
  • Tools: permission scoping, description integrity, high-impact action confirmation, argument validation, connector trust, and unauthorised-use detection.

Scope boundaries

  • Certification of a sandbox or identity platform; the assessment is scoped to your deployment.
  • Implementation of identity infrastructure, unless separately agreed.
  • Runtime redesign and infrastructure changes are not implied by the review. Remediation verification can be added for named findings; subsequent connector or sandbox changes need their own checks.

Decision and fit

Inspect identity, execution and tools as connected controls

Compare the engagement with the decision you face

Useful decisionA question worth resolving
Inspect identity, execution and tools as connected controls.
NeededAn accountable participant
Platform and security teams operating agents that run code, hold credentials or use tools with side effects.
PrerequisiteInspectable source material
The relevant owners can make workflow evidence and agreed inputs available for examination.
Different needA scope mismatch
The assistant has no tool access, execution runtime or persistent credentials.
Discuss fit and prerequisites together; a different need may require a separately scoped engagement.

The engagement

Make every delegation explicit. Examine who the agent acts for, where it can execute and which tools it can reach when instructions alone are not enough. A coordinated runtime-boundary assessment covering identity, execution isolation and tool access within one deployment.

The decision at stake

The agent runs with broad credentials because narrow ones were hard to arrange, tools were added faster than their permissions were reviewed, and nobody can state precisely on whose behalf the agent is acting at any moment.

Suitable situations

  • Platform and security teams operating agents that run code, hold credentials or use tools with side effects.
  • Organisations adopting tool protocols or connector marketplaces and needing a boundary model before scaling.
  • Teams running code-execution, browser or computer-use agents that need an isolation assessment.

Less suitable situations

  • Read-only assistants with no tool access and no persistent credentials.

Working sequence

How the work moves from question to handover

What each stage should leave your team with

  1. Inventory authority

    Identities, credentials and tools accounted for.

  2. Model intended boundaries

    Explicit authority and isolation expectations.

  3. Assess actual boundaries

    Configuration compared with the intended boundaries.

  4. Test selected boundaries

    Authorised probe results with affected surfaces.

  5. Recommend and verify

    Prioritised changes and verification responsibilities.

The sequence is tailored to the agreed workflow, evidence and acceptance criteria.

How the work proceeds

  1. Inventory authority. Enumerate identities, credentials, delegations and tools the agent uses, and how each was granted.
  2. Model intended boundaries. Define what the agent should be able to do, for whom, and under what confirmation, in a form that can be tested.
  3. Assess actual boundaries. Compare configuration, code and runtime behaviour to the intended model, including sandbox and network controls.
  4. Test selected boundaries. Exercise authorised probes for escalation, escape, secret exposure and unauthorised tool use.
  5. Recommend and verify. Prioritise changes, define policy tests, and confirm the boundaries with the team after remediation where agreed.

Worked situation

Follow one situation through to a bounded next decision

Illustrative working situation

Illustrative scenario

  1. Starting condition

    A narrowly tasked agent reaches a broadly scoped connector.

  2. Question to examine

    Follow identity, runtime and tool enforcement together.

  3. Possible next action

    Specify the control change and the case that would verify it.

Constructed example of the reasoning; no result or client engagement is claimed.

Decision artefacts

Leave a record the next owner can use

Authority boundary finding

Illustrative working format

Subject and version
Identify the workflow, configuration or proposal examined.
Delegation boundary
Record the relevant requirement and supporting material.
Tool boundary
State the observation, supporting evidence and remaining uncertainty.
Security owner
Record the next decision, follow-up and unresolved question.
Illustrative structure; final deliverables are agreed for each engagement.

What the work can produce

  • Authority model describing identities, delegations, scopes and revocation paths.
  • Isolation and tool-boundary assessment with findings and evidence.
  • Prioritised control changes with verification steps for each.
  • Policy tests that can be run to confirm the boundaries hold after changes.

Engagement notes

Read the detailed engagement considerations

How the detailed notes connect

Delegation boundary
Trace the principal and the action they authorised.
Execution boundary
Limit the runtime resources and routes in scope.
Tool boundary
Validate target, arguments and confirmation conditions.
The original service explanation is retained with its scope and qualifications.

Authority is the control that matters most

An agent’s capabilities are bounded far more by what it is allowed to do than by what it is instructed to do. Untrusted content can influence instructions; separately enforced permissions can restrict the resulting actions. The review therefore treats identity and delegation as the primary control, isolation as the second, and tool scoping as the third, and it looks for places where the practical difficulty of narrow permissions has been resolved by granting broad ones.

Making boundaries testable

Every intended boundary is written in a form that can be exercised: “the agent acting for user A cannot read records owned by user B”, “the code sandbox has no route to the internal network”, “a payment tool call requires a confirmation the user can see”. The policy tests produced by the review let the team confirm that the boundaries still hold after every change.

Working together

Your team and our team need a clear working agreement

Who contributes and who decides

Client sponsor
Confirms the decision, priorities and people needed to resolve it.
Client technical or process owner
Provides the agreed evidence, access and review of findings or deliverables.
Softlander delivery lead
Coordinates the agreed activities, review points, handover and open actions.
Authorised decision-maker
Accepts deliverables against the agreed criteria and separately decides operational or business action.
Client owners retain business, release and risk-acceptance decisions.

What the work depends on

  • Your platform, identity and security contacts provide runtime configuration, connector definitions, network policies and a representative test environment. An authorised owner approves probes and stop conditions before execution.
  • Access to identity configuration, secrets handling, sandbox and network policies, and tool definitions.
  • Written authorisation for any active testing and an agreed environment.

Engagement availability

The start date, named delivery roles, review points and fee basis are agreed after confirming the inputs and scope. Duration depends on evidence access, system complexity and the time your decision-makers need to review the work.

Engagement and handover

Agree the delivery model and what completion means

A clear agreement from scope to ownership

Scoped work
Identity: workload identity for agents, credential lifecycle, user-to-agent and agent-to-agent delegation, least privilege, propagation across tools, attribution and revocation.
Indicative handover
Authority model describing identities, delegations, scopes and revocation paths; Isolation and tool-boundary assessment with findings and evidence.
Review and acceptance
Review the agreed deliverables and record any open items, owners and conditions.
Ongoing work
Assign maintenance and operational ownership; agree additional scope and coverage explicitly.
The statement of work confirms milestones, review responsibilities, fees and change control before the engagement starts.

A coordinated runtime-boundary assessment covering identity, execution isolation and tool access within one deployment.

The assessment connects each tested boundary to its configuration, observed behaviour and reproducible case. The handover identifies untested surfaces and gives the platform owner a prioritised control backlog.

Runtime redesign and infrastructure changes are not implied by the review. Remediation verification can be added for named findings; subsequent connector or sandbox changes need their own checks.

Relevant reading

A little more clarity

Questions worth asking.

Start with the questions that shape a better decision.

We use a tool protocol with third-party servers. Is that in scope?

Yes. Connector trust, description integrity and permission scoping for protocol servers are part of the tool boundary review.

What is an "authority model"?

A written description of which identity the agent uses in each context, what it is permitted to do, who delegated that permission, how it is confirmed for high-impact actions, and how it is revoked. Most organisations have this implicitly; the review makes it explicit and testable.

How would we engage your team?

A coordinated runtime-boundary assessment covering identity, execution isolation and tool access within one deployment. The statement of work confirms the deliverables, review points, fee basis and responsibilities before work begins.

What does our team need to contribute?

Your platform, identity and security contacts provide runtime configuration, connector definitions, network policies and a representative test environment. An authorised owner approves probes and stop conditions before execution.

How do we accept the work and take ownership?

The assessment connects each tested boundary to its configuration, observed behaviour and reproducible case. The handover identifies untested surfaces and gives the platform owner a prioritised control backlog.

What happens after the engagement?

Runtime redesign and infrastructure changes are not implied by the review. Remediation verification can be added for named findings; subsequent connector or sandbox changes need their own checks.

How are timing and fees agreed?

We scope the work around the evidence and access available, technical complexity and the people needed for review. The proposal confirms milestones and whether fees are based on a defined scope, agreed delivery capacity or a recurring remit. Extra workflows, tests or integrations are agreed as changes rather than assumed to be included.

Discuss ai agent runtime security review

Tell us about the decision you are facing and we will confirm whether this service is the right starting point.