Capability family

Agent sandbox assurance

Know what the execution environment can contain.

A code, browser or computer-use agent can reach more than the visible task suggests. Examine the boundaries around its filesystem, network, secrets and lifecycle in the configuration you intend to run.

Know what the execution environment can contain

Workload process
The code or browser session executing the delegated task.
Filesystem mounts
The paths and shared volumes the workload can access.
Network routes
The destinations reachable from inside the environment.
Lifecycle cleanup
The state that remains when execution ends.
Conceptual model of the discipline; the engagement boundary requires separate agreement.

Discipline model

Name the resources the workload must not reach

The relationships that define the discipline

Workload process
The process sits inside controls whose configuration defines its reach.
Filesystem mounts
Mounts connect workload storage to resources outside the process boundary.
Network routes
Routes can cross host, tenant and external-service trust boundaries.
Lifecycle cleanup
Teardown determines what state can cross from one execution to the next.
Use these connected areas to identify which specialist questions matter for the workflow.

Sandbox assurance concerns the space in which an agent executes. Runtime packaging alone does not describe every allowed crossing: host mounts, network routes, injected secrets and shared caches can change the effective boundary. Start with the protected resources and identify each mechanism that separates them from the workload.

Illustrative situation

Reused environments need a cleanup boundary

A constructed situation to reason through

Illustrative scenario

  1. Session completes

    An agent finishes processing a confidential draft.

  2. Workspace reused

    A later workload receives the same persistent volume.

  3. Boundary question

    Determine whether prior data remains accessible.

Illustrative scenario; no observed test result or customer outcome is claimed.

Use this situation to identify the evidence that would change the decision. The proposed examination must stay within the agreed scope, and any conclusion must describe the conditions actually inspected.

Working approach

Examine the runtime across its full lifecycle

Proposed investigation sequence

  1. Define workload process

    State the decision and conditions the work must address.

  2. Map filesystem mounts

    Connect the relevant actors, configuration and evidence.

  3. Examine network routes

    Use agreed evidence and controlled cases where appropriate.

  4. Review lifecycle cleanup

    Record limits, ownership and the condition for a next decision.

The workflow, available evidence and authority determine the actual activities.

Map the runtime architecture and deployment configuration before selecting authorised probes. Examine filesystem and network access, secret handling, resource limits and tenant separation. Include startup, interruption, snapshot restoration and teardown: a boundary that holds during one process may depend on what happens when an environment is reused.

Working artefact

Record the crossing and the resulting state

Illustrative working record

Illustrative working format

Workload process
Define the subject and the requirement the record addresses.
Evidence reference
Link source, version and observed condition without copying sensitive material.
Network routes
Explain the finding or choice and its consequence.
Lifecycle cleanup
Assign the next action and state what remains unresolved.
A proposed artefact structure, with no completed engagement or measured result implied.

An isolation finding should name the protected resource, attempted crossing, relevant configuration, observed response and final state. This lets the platform owner distinguish a denied request from a resource that remained reachable by another path. Findings should identify the tested runtime and configuration rather than generalize to every use of the product.

Scope and next decision

Agree authorised probes and platform responsibilities

Prepare a bounded next discussion

Starting pointWorkload process
Bring one concrete workflow question and its accountable owner.
PrerequisiteFilesystem mounts
Identify the evidence and access that can be made available.
DependencyNetwork routes
Agree the specialist involvement and responsibilities required.
Next decisionWritten scope
Confirm activities, evidence, readiness and acceptance before commitment.
Research topics require a defined question, an agreed method and suitable expertise before work begins.

Active boundary testing requires written authorisation, agreed targets and stop conditions. A scoped assessment cannot certify a sandbox product or establish escape impossibility. Platform controls and customer configuration need separate evidence and clearly assigned owners.

Explore the discipline

Specialist areas within this capability

Choose a question to explore its methods, boundaries and indicative outputs.

Search this capability family

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A little more clarity

Questions worth asking.

Start with the questions that shape a better decision.

Does using a container establish isolation?

No. The relevant evidence includes runtime configuration, privileges, mounts, network access and host separation. A container label alone does not answer those questions.

What is included in a sandbox boundary?

The selected scope may include processes, filesystems, network routes, secrets, shared state, resource limits and tenant separation, plus the lifecycle that creates and destroys the environment.

Why examine cleanup after execution?

Files, caches or credentials may survive the task. Cleanup checks examine whether a later session or tenant could access state that should no longer be available.

Can browser and computer-use agents be assessed?

Yes, their execution environment can be scoped around browser profiles, downloads, clipboard access, filesystem permissions and reachable services. The actual configuration determines the tests.

Does an escape-resistance assessment guarantee no escape?

No. It reports the authorised scenarios, configuration, observations and limits examined. Unobserved paths and future runtime changes remain outside that conclusion.

What information is needed first?

Bring the runtime design, deployment configuration, protected resources and a representative authorised environment. Share references to secret-handling arrangements rather than credential values.

Make the question specific.

Bring the workflow, the decision and the evidence you already have. We will confirm the relevant scope and availability together.