Sandbox architecture review
Decide whether the proposed execution boundary matches the agent's privileges
An agent is being allowed to run generated code or use a desktop. The decision is how to decide whether the proposed execution boundary matches the agent's privileges. The work begins with your actual workflow and looks for the evidence that separates intended behaviour from a consequential exception. It is particularly relevant to platform security architects and runtime owners. A useful outcome is an explicit account of what was examined, what remains uncertain, and which decision the evidence can support.
The runtime isolation relationship
- Deployment diagrams
Establish the basis for worker runtime.
- Attached resources
Map mounts, secrets, and permitted connections.
- Sandbox architecture review
Retain the scoped finding and its unresolved dependencies.
Decision
Frame the decision around worker runtime
Questions and the evidence they need
- Worker runtime
- Inspect deployment diagrams for the relevant constraint or observation.
- Attached resources
- Inspect mount configuration for the relevant constraint or observation.
- Control plane
- Inspect network routes for the relevant constraint or observation.
The decision is how to decide whether the proposed execution boundary matches the agent’s privileges. This is relevant to platform security architects and runtime owners when an agent is being allowed to run generated code or use a desktop. Name the affected workflow, the consequence of a wrong decision, and the owner who can act on the result. The initial discussion should establish which evidence is already available and which uncertainty is material enough to investigate.
The specific failure hypothesis is that the team assumes a sandbox label covers host resources that are actually shared. It remains a hypothesis until examined in the deployment. Existing internal tests or operating records may already resolve it; identify the uncovered question before commissioning additional work.
Mechanism
The sandbox boundary includes its control plane
Relationships within runtime isolation
- Worker runtime
- Name reachable processes and privileges.
- Attached resources
- Map mounts, secrets, and permitted connections.
- Control plane
- Inspect launch authority and exported artefacts.
What this specialty examines
A sandbox architecture review should identify the boundary around execution and the interfaces that cross it. Compute separation, filesystem mounts, network access, credentials and control-plane operations deserve individual treatment. A diagram should show inherited trust rather than leaving shared resources implicit.
The review should map processes, files, network, secrets and control-plane access to explicit trust boundaries. Identify the normal route, relevant exceptions and the authoritative record of the outcome. Inspect the relevant business-system record, enforcement event or process evidence alongside any reported status. Keep incomplete cases visible, with an explanation of what their absence prevents the owner from concluding.
The tradeoff to make explicit
For this decision, developer convenience favours shared resources while containment requires deliberate limits. Compare the available design or operating choices against the same intended outcome. If one option removes a required control or changes the task boundary, describe that difference before treating its apparent simplicity, speed or lower effort as an improvement. The decision should expose the tradeoff instead of burying it in an aggregate score.
Preparation
Connect the working inputs to the boundary being examined
Evidence packet for worker runtime
Illustrative working format
- Deployment diagrams
- Match this description to the deployed or proposed boundary being examined.
- Mount configuration
- Resolve source, target, and permitted access, including indirect path crossings.
- Network routes
- Trace destination resolution and the control that permits or denies the connection.
- Privilege settings
- Inspect effective execution authority and the role able to change it.
Start with deployment diagrams, mount configuration, network routes and privilege settings. Identify the owner, revision and operating context of each source. Sanitised examples may support initial design, but differences from actual conditions should remain explicit. Where direct access is unsuitable, a customer-controlled evidence or execution route may be considered, with agreed handling and retention.
The scope also needs the runtime owner, agreed expectations for a representative boundary test, and the authority to inspect the relevant boundary. Specify what evidence would distinguish the failure in which the team assumes a sandbox label covers host resources that are actually shared from acceptable behaviour. If stakeholders disagree about intended behaviour, resolve the interpretation before classifying the observed difference as a defect.
How the work proceeds
Carry worker runtime through to an accountable finding
From the scoped material to a decision record
- Deployment diagrams
Declare the permitted environment and resources.
- Attached resources
Apply the scoped check to control plane.
- Sandbox architecture review
Record the evidence, open dependencies, and the owner’s next decision.
Prepare the runtime boundary and fixtures
Use deployment diagrams, mount configuration, network routes and privilege settings to identify the exact runtime and boundary claimed by platform security architects and runtime owners. Mark permitted resources and protected resources in a controlled fixture, including shared services where they are relevant. Define observable success, denial and incomplete setup before execution. The preparation output is a boundary map and fixture manifest that lets reviewers distinguish effective isolation from a test that never reached its target.
Exercise and inspect the boundary
Inspect effective configuration alongside design intent. Helpers, management sockets and artefact services can expose resources beyond the worker’s apparent boundary. Record which claims require specialist testing and which can be established through configuration evidence.
Choose containment or configuration changes
Translate the observations into a sandbox architecture review with boundary assumptions and proposed validation priorities. Locate each issue in the worker, shared service, policy rollout or cleanup path rather than attributing every symptom to the sandbox as a whole. Decide which configuration change, narrower resource exposure or specialist investigation is warranted. Retest the affected boundary and inspect residual state before treating the changed environment as equivalent to the intended design.
Indicative artefact
Make the sandbox architecture review usable by its owner
Sandbox architecture review
Illustrative working format
- Sandbox architecture review
- Identify the assessed workflow, revision, and decision boundary.
- Boundary assumptions
- Distinguish verified conditions from assumptions that require confirmation before use.
- Validation priorities
- Name the missing evidence, responsible owner, and condition for revisiting the decision.
A useful decision artefact is a sandbox architecture review with boundary assumptions and proposed validation priorities. Supporting material may include selected cases, configuration or process records, evidence references, a disagreement log and prioritised actions. Retain the case selection rationale and material disagreements alongside the result; otherwise the result may be mistaken for complete coverage.
Illustrative scenario
A mounted workspace should expose only the files the task needs
Task inputs and the host mount boundary
Illustrative scenario
- Host-mounted workspace
An isolated code worker receives a workspace that also contains files unrelated to its task.
- Required task files
Classify the necessary inputs and compare them with the files reachable through the mount.
- Narrower input boundary
If unrelated files are exposed, consider a narrower mount or separate artefact exchange.
Consider a fictional situation: a code assistant runs in an isolated worker but receives a host-mounted workspace containing unrelated files. The scenario is illustrative, with no client engagement, executed test or measured improvement implied.
For the host-mounted workspace, classify the files actually needed by the task. A narrower mount or separate artefact exchange may be appropriate. The decision should consider how the agent receives useful inputs without gaining unrelated host access.
Scope and next action
Keep the conclusion within the authorised runtime boundary
Confirm fit before the next commitment
- Worker runtime
- This review is limited to the authorised runtime boundary.
- Deployment diagrams
- The relevant owner must confirm access and the intended operating conditions.
- Sandbox architecture review
- Untested surfaces remain outside the conclusion.
Testing is confined to explicitly authorised environments and non-destructive cases. A bounded assessment cannot establish that escape or cross-boundary access is impossible. Any engagement depends on an agreed scope, qualified team, authorised access and confirmed availability. Bring the affected workflow, its current configuration or process, the triggering change and the evidence already available. The immediate scope question is prompted by the situation in which an agent is being allowed to run generated code or use a desktop; confirm which missing observation would change the owner’s next action.
Ways to engage
Related engagement scopes
AI Agent Runtime Security Review
Make every delegation explicit. Examine who the agent acts for, where it can execute and which tools it can reach when instructions alone are not enough.
AI Agent Red Team
Challenge the boundaries that matter to your workflow. Test agreed attack scenarios against agent instructions, tools and data access.
AI Agent Sandbox Assurance
Examine the boundary between agent execution and the systems around it, including files, networks, secrets and cleanup.
Continue exploring
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