Filesystem-access testing
Verify what files an agent execution environment can read or change
Workspace mounts or file tools expose more than the task requires. The decision is how to verify what files an agent execution environment can read or change. The work begins with your actual workflow and looks for the evidence that separates intended behaviour from a consequential exception. It is particularly relevant to platform engineers and data owners. A useful outcome is an explicit account of what was examined, what remains uncertain, and which decision the evidence can support.
The runtime isolation relationship
- Mount maps
Establish the basis for mount boundary.
- Path resolution
Check traversal and symbolic-link destinations.
- Filesystem access matrix
Retain the scoped finding and its unresolved dependencies.
Decision
Frame the decision around mount boundary
Questions and the evidence they need
- Mount boundary
- Inspect mount maps for the relevant constraint or observation.
- Path resolution
- Inspect path permissions for the relevant constraint or observation.
- Write and cleanup
- Inspect symlink rules for the relevant constraint or observation.
The decision is how to verify what files an agent execution environment can read or change. This is relevant to platform engineers and data owners when workspace mounts or file tools expose more than the task requires. Name the affected workflow, the consequence of a wrong decision, and the owner who can act on the result. The initial discussion should establish which evidence is already available and which uncertainty is material enough to investigate.
The specific failure hypothesis is that a permitted workspace path resolves through a link to a protected location. It remains a hypothesis until examined in the deployment. Existing internal tests or operating records may already resolve it; identify the uncovered question before commissioning additional work.
Mechanism
Filesystem authority follows resolved paths
Relationships within runtime isolation
- Mount boundary
- Separate permitted workspaces from protected fixtures.
- Path resolution
- Check traversal and symbolic-link destinations.
- Write and cleanup
- Inspect actual effects and retained files.
What this specialty examines
Filesystem review should consider resolved paths, permissions and ownership, not just input strings. Enumerate read, write, create, delete and traversal behaviour where relevant. Include temporary directories, outputs and shared volumes that may fall outside the main workspace.
The review should test read, write, traversal, link and cleanup cases within an approved file fixture. Identify the normal route, relevant exceptions and the authoritative record of the outcome. Inspect the relevant business-system record, enforcement event or process evidence alongside any reported status. Keep incomplete cases visible, with an explanation of what their absence prevents the owner from concluding.
The tradeoff to make explicit
For this decision, shared workspaces ease collaboration while increasing the need for path and ownership controls. Compare the available design or operating choices against the same intended outcome. If one option removes a required control or changes the task boundary, describe that difference before treating its apparent simplicity, speed or lower effort as an improvement. The decision should expose the tradeoff instead of burying it in an aggregate score.
Preparation
Connect the working inputs to the boundary being examined
Evidence packet for mount boundary
Illustrative working format
- Mount maps
- Resolve source, target, and permitted access, including indirect path crossings.
- Path permissions
- Resolve source, target, and permitted access, including indirect path crossings.
- Symlink rules
- Resolve source, target, and permitted access, including indirect path crossings.
- Synthetic sensitive-file markers
- Keep expected behaviour and the limits of the constructed example explicit.
Start with mount maps, path permissions, symlink rules and synthetic sensitive-file markers. Identify the owner, revision and operating context of each source. Sanitised examples may support initial design, but differences from actual conditions should remain explicit. Where direct access is unsuitable, a customer-controlled evidence or execution route may be considered, with agreed handling and retention.
The scope also needs the runtime owner, agreed expectations for a representative boundary test, and the authority to inspect the relevant boundary. Specify what evidence would distinguish the failure in which a permitted workspace path resolves through a link to a protected location from acceptable behaviour. If stakeholders disagree about intended behaviour, resolve the interpretation before classifying the observed difference as a defect.
How the work proceeds
Carry mount boundary through to an accountable finding
From the scoped material to a decision record
- Mount maps
Declare the permitted environment and resources.
- Path resolution
Apply the scoped check to write and cleanup.
- Filesystem access matrix
Record the evidence, open dependencies, and the owner’s next decision.
Prepare the runtime boundary and fixtures
Use mount maps, path permissions, symlink rules and synthetic sensitive-file markers to identify the exact runtime and boundary claimed by platform engineers and data owners. Mark permitted resources and protected resources in a controlled fixture, including shared services where they are relevant. Define observable success, denial and incomplete setup before execution. The preparation output is a boundary map and fixture manifest that lets reviewers distinguish effective isolation from a test that never reached its target.
Exercise and inspect the boundary
Use a fixture containing permitted files, denied markers and controlled links. Observe the actual target after resolution and any resulting modification. Distinguish denied access from missing files or failed setup, which can otherwise look deceptively similar in logs.
Choose containment or configuration changes
Translate the observations into a filesystem access matrix with path-resolution and permission findings. Locate each issue in the worker, shared service, policy rollout or cleanup path rather than attributing every symptom to the sandbox as a whole. Decide which configuration change, narrower resource exposure or specialist investigation is warranted. Retest the affected boundary and inspect residual state before treating the changed environment as equivalent to the intended design.
Indicative artefact
Make the filesystem access matrix usable by its owner
Filesystem access matrix
Illustrative working format
- Filesystem access matrix
- Identify the assessed workflow, revision, and decision boundary.
- Path-resolution
- Link supporting and contrary observations to inspectable evidence.
- Permission findings
- Link observations and counterevidence to the case, configuration, and conclusion limit.
A useful decision artefact is a filesystem access matrix with path-resolution and permission findings. Supporting material may include selected cases, configuration or process records, evidence references, a disagreement log and prioritised actions. Retain the case selection rationale and material disagreements alongside the result; otherwise the result may be mistaken for complete coverage.
Illustrative scenario
Examine write and cleanup through a constructed exception
A constructed case and its decision paths
Illustrative scenario
- Mount boundary
A permitted path resolves through a link to an excluded file fixture.
- Path resolution
Resolve the permitted path through its symbolic-link target.
- Write and cleanup
Apply the boundary to the resolved object rather than the path label alone.
Consider a fictional situation: a document-processing agent writes outputs to a shared directory and accidentally reaches another task’s files. The scenario is illustrative, with no client engagement, executed test or measured improvement implied.
For the shared output directory, create distinct synthetic task ownership. Check whether one task can overwrite or retrieve another’s artefact. The resulting decision may require separate namespaces or a mediated artefact service rather than prompt-level path instructions.
Scope and next action
Keep the conclusion within the authorised runtime boundary
Confirm fit before the next commitment
- Mount boundary
- This review is limited to the authorised runtime boundary.
- Mount maps
- The relevant owner must confirm access and the intended operating conditions.
- Filesystem access matrix
- Untested surfaces remain outside the conclusion.
Testing is confined to explicitly authorised environments and non-destructive cases. A bounded assessment cannot establish that escape or cross-boundary access is impossible. Any engagement depends on an agreed scope, qualified team, authorised access and confirmed availability. Bring the affected workflow, its current configuration or process, the triggering change and the evidence already available. The immediate scope question is prompted by the situation in which workspace mounts or file tools expose more than the task requires; confirm which missing observation would change the owner’s next action.
Ways to engage
Related engagement scopes
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AI Agent Red Team
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AI Agent Sandbox Assurance
Examine the boundary between agent execution and the systems around it, including files, networks, secrets and cleanup.
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