Engineer the harness, not just the prompt
Define the contracts around an agent's decisions: what state it trusts, which actions can execute, how interrupted work resumes, and what evidence an operator needs to recover safely.
Category
Designing the system around the model: orchestration, memory, context, tools, observability and recovery.
Most of the behaviour of an agentic system is decided outside the model, in how work is decomposed, how context is assembled, how tools are described and bounded, how memory is written and read, and how failures are detected and recovered. This category covers agent architecture patterns, orchestration and delegation, memory and retrieval design, tool and connector engineering, observability and tracing, and the engineering practices that make an agent inspectable enough to evaluate and safe enough to operate.
Define the contracts around an agent's decisions: what state it trusts, which actions can execute, how interrupted work resumes, and what evidence an operator needs to recover safely.
An agent can only be evaluated in the context of what its tools allow. Examine identity, delegated authority and action boundaries before you put a workflow in motion.
A working paper for the moment an AI system moves from advice to action. Map identity, permissions, approvals and recovery into an authority model your team can review and test.
A release decision needs a traceable connection between expected behaviour, test conditions and observed results. Here is a practical way to build that connection.
A retrieval system should establish the active principal and filter authorised resources before similarity ranking or model context assembly.
A computer-use agent treats pixels, accessibility data and interface state as both evidence and an action surface. Security must bind intent to effects beyond the screen.
Production readiness for an AI agent spans workflow requirements, system identity, evaluation, recovery and operations—not just a working model endpoint.
A safe handoff transfers the decision, evidence, current state and bounded authority—not a transcript dump or a vague request for someone to take over.
Openness can improve inspectability, control and portability, but only when an organisation can own the supply chain, operation and evidence it inherits.
Classify AI by the action path it creates, not the label on the product. The distinction determines ownership, controls, evaluation and release evidence.
A wrong answer is the final symptom of failures that may begin with source coverage, access control, parsing, retrieval, context assembly, generation or action.
Agent credentials should be shorter-lived than the assumptions that justify them. Bind them to a workload, audience, task and action, then prove renewal and revocation work.
Smaller models are not merely budget substitutes. Used behind explicit routing and escalation rules, they can improve latency, locality and architectural control.
A reference trace can explain one acceptable journey. Treating it as the only correct path can punish valid behaviour and conceal unsafe alternatives.
“Internet access” is too broad a permission for an agent. Define destinations, protocols, data-release rules and failure behaviour, then test bypasses against the deployed network path.
Maintenance agents can turn condition signals into coordinated work, but plant safety and control demand bounded action and field verification.
A joint lab should be a governed way to create decision evidence across organisations, with shared methods but explicit ownership of systems, data and conclusions.
Long-running agent work cannot rely on a transcript and hopeful retries. Explicit state makes progress, authority, recovery and completion inspectable across failures.
Agents earn their complexity only when a workflow needs bounded adaptation. A disciplined no-agent test can reveal when rules, search or ordinary software is safer and cheaper.
Least privilege for agents is not a smaller role assigned once. It is authority narrowed by identity, task, resource, action, time and consequence at every tool call.
Deleting a chat is not the same as removing personal data from memory, retrieval, logs, caches, evaluations, backups and learned models.
A passing patch is only the start. Repository evaluation should test understanding, change quality, security, reviewability and recovery.
Protocols make tools and agents interoperable, but they also standardise discovery, delegation and context exchange. Those interfaces need explicit trust and policy controls.
A convincing message can conceal a failed or unauthorised operation. Agent evaluation must inspect tool calls, external state and control decisions.
Keep sensitive data under client control by moving approved methods and people to the environment, exporting only the minimum reviewed evidence needed for collaboration.
An orchestrator should be judged by the workflow it controls: decomposition, routing, state, authority, recovery, verification and stopping—not by a polished final response.
Run evaluations often, but interrupt people only when a signal maps to user consequence, a decision owner and a tested response.
Review an MCP server as a privileged protocol adapter: verify tool semantics, OAuth boundaries, token audience, downstream delegation, input handling, isolation, logging and consent.
A useful agent threat model follows data, instructions, identity, tools and state across trust boundaries. This method turns the map into test cases and control decisions.
An agent becomes especially risky when it can read secrets, ingest attacker-controlled material and communicate or act outside the boundary. Design the workflow to break that combination.
Context is the information available for one inference. Memory is a governed process for retaining, changing and recalling information across time. Confusing them creates silent risk.
Tool-using agents join untrusted input, probabilistic decisions and privileged action. CISOs should govern that path as a security system, not a chatbot feature.
A support agent should be judged on whether it resolves the right problem safely, not on whether its first answer sounds convincing.
Useful observability reconstructs a decision and its effects. Begin with incident, release and governance questions; then collect the smallest safe evidence that answers them.
Classify an AI agent by what it can affect, the authority it can exercise and how quickly people can recover—not by how autonomous a demo appears.
A tool-using agent is a controlled system around a model, not a model with an API key. Map its runtime layers before deciding what to test, trust or release.
A model router is a policy for allocating quality, cost, latency, privacy and failure risk. Evaluate whether each route serves the workflow—not whether routing is fashionable.
Multi-agent systems fail between workers when goals, evidence, state, authority and completion semantics do not survive the transfer. Test the protocol, not just each agent.
Neutral advice compares dependencies and evidence against the client's decision; it does not pretend every platform is interchangeable or that vendors add no value.
A sandbox limits what compromised execution can reach. Authorisation decides what an authenticated actor may do. Secure agents need both, tested independently and together.
Retries, duplicated messages and uncertain tool outcomes can multiply an agent’s effects. Idempotency turns a logical action into one controlled business operation.
Long-running agents accumulate state, dependencies and chances to drift. Evaluation must test checkpoints, recovery, changing conditions and complete outcomes across time.
Describe autonomy operation by operation. A multidimensional action map gives leaders a better basis for limits, oversight and release evidence than one marketing label.
Better agent context is not the largest possible context. It is the smallest authorised, relevant and timely data set that supports the task.
Self-modification turns runtime learning into controlled software change. Separate what may adapt, require evidence for promotion and preserve a recoverable baseline.
A logistics agent earns trust when data becomes late, routes close and plans conflict—not when everything follows the timetable.
Inject realistic faults, verify state and judge the recovery path. A retry that finishes the task can still duplicate work or hide uncertainty.
Prompt injection becomes consequential when untrusted content can steer a model towards privileged tools. Reduce the blast radius by redesigning the workflow around trust and authority.
Model selection matters, but production behaviour emerges from an entire dependency graph. Review the system that turns model output into business effects.
Bring one agent workflow and the decision in front of you. Gaurav Tiwari replies personally within 1 working day.