The permission boundary behind every agent action
An agent can only be evaluated in the context of what its tools allow. Examine identity, delegated authority and action boundaries before you put a workflow in motion.
Controls that constrain tool access, arguments, data movement and consequential actions in agent systems.
An agent can only be evaluated in the context of what its tools allow. Examine identity, delegated authority and action boundaries before you put a workflow in motion.
A computer-use agent treats pixels, accessibility data and interface state as both evidence and an action surface. Security must bind intent to effects beyond the screen.
Agent credentials should be shorter-lived than the assumptions that justify them. Bind them to a workload, audience, task and action, then prove renewal and revocation work.
“Internet access” is too broad a permission for an agent. Define destinations, protocols, data-release rules and failure behaviour, then test bypasses against the deployed network path.
Maintenance agents can turn condition signals into coordinated work, but plant safety and control demand bounded action and field verification.
Least privilege for agents is not a smaller role assigned once. It is authority narrowed by identity, task, resource, action, time and consequence at every tool call.
A passing patch is only the start. Repository evaluation should test understanding, change quality, security, reviewability and recovery.
Protocols make tools and agents interoperable, but they also standardise discovery, delegation and context exchange. Those interfaces need explicit trust and policy controls.
Review an MCP server as a privileged protocol adapter: verify tool semantics, OAuth boundaries, token audience, downstream delegation, input handling, isolation, logging and consent.
A useful agent threat model follows data, instructions, identity, tools and state across trust boundaries. This method turns the map into test cases and control decisions.
An agent becomes especially risky when it can read secrets, ingest attacker-controlled material and communicate or act outside the boundary. Design the workflow to break that combination.
Tool-using agents join untrusted input, probabilistic decisions and privileged action. CISOs should govern that path as a security system, not a chatbot feature.
KEEP EXPLORING
Read the method, assumptions and questions to ask.