How to map an AI agent’s attack surface
A useful agent threat model follows data, instructions, identity, tools and state across trust boundaries. This method turns the map into test cases and control decisions.
Threats, controls and review methods for systems that read untrusted content and act through tools.
A useful agent threat model follows data, instructions, identity, tools and state across trust boundaries. This method turns the map into test cases and control decisions.
An agent becomes especially risky when it can read secrets, ingest attacker-controlled material and communicate or act outside the boundary. Design the workflow to break that combination.
A dramatic exploit is a discovery, not a decision rule. Translate it into a threat condition, required control, repeatable regression and release consequence.
Tool-using agents join untrusted input, probabilistic decisions and privileged action. CISOs should govern that path as a security system, not a chatbot feature.
A procurement agent may discover, compare and prepare, but supplier commitments require explicit mandates, separation and evidence.
A sandbox limits what compromised execution can reach. Authorisation decides what an authenticated actor may do. Secure agents need both, tested independently and together.
Stopping one process may leave tools, queued actions, delegated agents and credentials active. Define the safe state, control every action path and rehearse the stop under load.
Prompt injection becomes consequential when untrusted content can steer a model towards privileged tools. Reduce the blast radius by redesigning the workflow around trust and authority.
Financial agents combine models, data, tools, people and third parties, so assurance has to follow the complete regulated workflow.
KEEP EXPLORING
Read the method, assumptions and questions to ask.
A little more clarity
Start with the questions that shape a better decision.
The blog examines where agents create business value, how teams define release evidence, how authority and tool access should be bounded, and how engineering, security and governance owners can make a shared decision.
They are written for product, engineering, AI platform, security, governance and transformation leaders responsible for moving an agent workflow from idea or pilot towards accountable operation.
Articles explain the problems and decision methods behind the consultancy’s service direction. They are educational material and do not replace a scoped review of an organisation’s actual system.